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THE DUTY OF THE MANUFACTURER
TO RECALL AIRCRAFT
GEORGE M. FLEMING*
T HE AMERICAN public is familiar with efforts by manufac-
turers and the government to recall defective products. Recall
campaigns have touched a variety of consumer items; home appli-
ances, toys, electronics and automobiles are a few.' In many
industries, regulatory guidelines have developed to help prevent
defective products from entering the market and to deal with de-
fective products once they reach the consumer. The civil aviation
industry also has developed guidelines dealing with defective
products.
The United States civil aircraft fleet currently numbers approxi-
mately 190,000 units.! The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 em-
powers the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to promote the
safety of this ever-increasing number by prescribing minimum air-
worthiness standards governing the design, materials, workman-
ship, construction, and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines,
appliances, and propellers.' The FAA administers these minimum
safety standards through a system of aircraft certification. The
FAA issues three categories of aircraft certificates: (1) type cer-
* George M. Fleming practices law in Austin, Texas with the firm of Byrd,
Davis & Eisenberg. He was formerly a Trial Attorney with the U.S. Department
of Justice Aviation Unit.
A graduate of the University of Texas Law School, George Fleming is a
member of the Texas and District of Columbia bars, the Aviation Law and the
Insurance and Compensation Law Committees of the American Bar Association,
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I See 2 CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION ANN. REP. 103 (1975)
for a listing of the different types of products that have been recalled by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission.
2 Bus. & CoM. Av., Dec., 1978, at 81.
149 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1), (2) (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33,
35, 36 and 37 (1979).
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tificates which are normally issued to manufacturers for new or
modified aircraft, aircraft engines and propellers; (2) production
certificates which are issued to manufacturers that intend to pro-
duce type certificated aircraft or related parts; and (3) airworthi-
ness certificates which state that an aircraft conforms to the ap-
proved design under a type certificate and is in a condition for safe
operation.'
The FAA requires manufacturers to report defects they find in
their products which affect the safety of flight.' This is usually done
by a manufacturing representative contacting the FAA regional
office with responsibility over that particular manufacturer. Repair
facilities are also required to report to the FAA defects or unair-
worthy conditions they discover.! General aviation mechanics util-
ize the Malfunction or Defect Report7 to report defects they dis-
cover. Air carriers and air taxi operators report this same informa-
tion in a Service Difficulty Report.!
When the FAA determines an unsafe condition exists in a
product that is likely to exist or develop in other products of the
same type design, the FAA issues an airworthiness directive.9
This directive may prescribe inspections, parts replacement, or
modifications. The directive may also prescribe conditions and
limitations under which a product may continue to be operated."
The Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) require operators to
conform to airworthiness directives (AD's) applicable to their
aircraft.1
AD's are Federal Aviation Regulations and are published in
the Federal Register as amendments to FAR Part 39. Depending
on the seriousness of the unsafe condition, AD's are published in
one of the following categories:
a. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). An NPRM is
issued by the FAA when it is determined there is no emer-
'49 U.S.C. § 1423(a), (b), (c) (1976).
614 C.F.R. § 21.3, 37.17 (1979).
6 14 C.F.R. § 145.63 (1979).
7 F.A.A. Form 8330-2.
8 F.A.A. Form 8070-1.
9 14 C.F.R. S 39.1 (1979).
10 14 C.F.R. 5 39.11 (1979).
11 14 C.F.R. S 39.3 (1979).
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gency affecting air safety. Interested persons are invited to
comment by submitting any written data or arguments they
desire. Proposals contained in the notice may be changed or
withdrawn in light of the comments received. When an
NPRM is adopted as a final rule, it is published in the Fed-
eral Register and then printed and distributed by mail to the
registered owners of the make and model affected.
b. Immediate Adopted Rule. This is an AD of an urgent na-
ture where prompt action is essential. Unlike the NPRM, it
is issued without prior notice. This type of AD is made effec-
tive less than thirty days after publication in the Federal
Register and is distributed by mail to the registered owners
of the make and model affected.
c. Emergency AD. This type of AD is issued when immediate
action is required to correct an unsafe condition. Emergency
AD's are distributed to the registered owners of the make
and model affected by telegram or priority mail. An example
of this type of directive is the AD issued by the FAA in
the aftermath of the American Airlines DC-10 crash which
occurred at Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979. Three days
after the accident telegraphic AD's were issued by the FAA
to operators of McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 series air-
planes "because of a possibility of a wing mounted engine
pylon support failure which could result in departure of the
engine from the airframe.""2
An additional form of advising aircraft owners of potentially
dangerous conditions is the manufacturer's service bulletin. The
manufacturer may issue a service bulletin setting out the manu-
facturer's recommendations concerning the inspection, modifica-
tion, or repair of a product. This may be done if the manufacturer's
recommendations do not meet FAA criteria to issue an airworthi-
ness directive, or if the manufacturer desires to make recom-
mendations while the FAA is considering issuing an airworthi-
ness directive. For example, McDonnell Douglas telegraphed an
Alert Service Bulletin to DC-10 operators two days after the
American Airlines DC-10 accident which occurred at Chicago on
May 25, 1979. This McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin
1'244 Fed. Reg. 37,617 (1979).
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A54-68 recommended inspections of the wing pylon mount systems
on DC-10s.
MANUFACTURERS' CONTINUING POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN USERS
OF DEFECTS AND TO DEVELOP CORRECTIVE MEASURES
The consumer of aviation services places great reliance on those
who design and manufacture aircraft and aircraft components.
This reliance is based on the consumer's deference to one with
superior knowledge. The manufacturer's superior knowledge of
his product and the continuing development of his product lines
imposes a responsibility on the manufacturer to the consumer.
Users of aviation services obviously have an important stake in
assuring that aviation manufacturers advise users of potential de-
fects in their products after the sale. Thus, the courts have held
that a manufacturer is under a continuing duty to warn users of
a dangerous condition that comes to its attention after the product
enters the stream of commerce."
In Noel v. United Aircraft Corp.," the court directly confronts
the manufacturer's post-sale duty to develop and supply improved
devices to remedy serious dangers in products previously marketed.
The Noel1 case was brought under the Death on the High Seas
Act" on behalf of a passenger of a Lockheed Constellation owned
by a Venezuelan airline which exploded en route from New York
to Venezuela. The suit was not brought against the airline or the
manufacturer of the aircraft, but rather against the manufacturer
of the propellers. The district court found that uncontrolled pro-
peller overspeed developed in the number two engine," and when
the flight crew could not feather the propeller, the captain decided
to return to New York. The court found that this prolonged pro-
peller overspeed in the number two engine resulted in the com-
plete separation of the propeller." The separated propeller pene-
13 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8.02 (1978).
14219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 342 F.2d 232 (3d
Cir. 1964).
"-5219 F. Supp. 556, 557.
1646 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1976).
1 "Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 219 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Del. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964).
18 Id. at 566.
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trated the fuselage of the aircraft, slashing through the fuselage
and into the belly tank of gas located immediately under the floor,
causing it to explode.'"
The district court in Noel noted that the manufacturer was aware
of the problem six years prior to the accident? Before the acci-
dent the propeller manufacturer developed a device to remedy
this same defect to be used on the Lockheed Electra, but not on
the Constellation. 1 The court imposed a post-sale duty upon the
propeller manufacturer to develop and supply improved devices to
remedy serious dangers in products previously marketed.' Both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, con-
sidering the risk to the flying public, pointed out that the manu-
facturer's duty to remedy serious dangers in its products is to be
performed with promptness.' The Third Circuit in Noel stated:
The record establishes that the respondent [the propeller manu-
facturer] was aware that absent some type of control mechanism,
continued use of its propeller systems on Lockheed Constellations
endangered the public, and that despite this awareness it permitted
the development of an effective safety device adaptable to these
planes to lag behind similar development for other airplanes.'
Noel clearly imposes a duty on manufacturers to research and
develop an improved product and to make corrective devices avail-
able within a reasonable time. The case sets out an independent
actionable theory of recovery against a manufacturer who fails to
develop curative devices in a timely fashion.
It is well established that when a manufacturer sells a product,
having actual or constructive knowledge that there is danger in-
volved in its use, he has a duty to warn the purchaser.' Noel
19 Id.
20 Id. at 570.
2 'Id. at 571.
22Id. at 572.
23 Id.
'Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 1964). See also
Note, Products Liability-Post-Sale Duty to Cure Dangerous Defects, 40 TUL. L.
RF-v. 436 (1966).
'DeVito v. United Airlines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Witt Ice &
Gas Co. v. Bedway, 72 Ariz. 152, 231 P.2d 952 (1951); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 388, 389, 394 (1965).
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logically extends this duty to dangers the manufacturer discovers
after the sale.
In Braniff Airways v. Curtis Wright Corp.," the Second Circuit
cited the Noel principle but found it unnecessary under the Bran-
iff facts to adopt Noel. The court indicated instead that where the
manufacturer becomes aware of a dangerously defective design,
"[t]he manufacturer has a duty either to remedy these or, if com-
plete remedy is not feasible, at least to give users adequate warn-
ings and instructions concerning the methods for minimizing the
danger." In another aviation case, O'Keefe v. Boeing Co.," the
New York District Court noted that some aviation manufacturers
have assumed a continuous post-sale duty to develop and supply
improved devices to remedy marketed defective products as part
of the manufacturer's standard custom and practice."
The duty of the manufacturer to eliminate or mitigate hazard-
ous products after sale has also been recognized in cases involving
other industries. The two principal industries in which the courts
have recognized a continuous duty on the part of manufacturers
to correct defective products, or warn of their danger are the drug
and automobile" industries, although this issue has also been liti-
gated in other industries." In these non-aviation cases the courts
have stated that manufacturers have the obligation "to keep abreast
of scientific developments touching upon the manufacturer."'" The
leading non-aviation case in this area is Comstock v. General
Motors Corp.," an early landmark case extending the manufac-
turer's duty to warn at the time of sale to defects which are dis-
covered after the sale:
26411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir. 1969).
27 Id.
21335 F. Supp. 1104, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
29 Id.
'o Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970).
31 Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959);
Kuhner v. Marlyn Manor, Inc., 129 N.J. Super. 554, 324 A.2d 128 (1974).
"Hall v. E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(explosive manufacturers); Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 115 Ariz. App. 454, 565
P.2d 1315 (1977) (cement block-cubing machine manufacturer); Bexiga v. Havir
Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) (punch-press manufacturer).
"Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970).
' Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
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If such duty to warn of a known danger exists at the point of
sale, we believe a like duty to give prompt warning exists when a
dangerous defect which makes the product hazardous to life be-
comes known to the manufacturer shortly after the product has
been put on the market.'
Additional support for the imposition of a continuing duty on
aviation manufacturers to advise users of dangerous conditions
discovered by the manufacturer in its product after the sale is
found in the Federal Aviation Regulations. As discussed earlier,
the Federal Aviation Regulations require the aviation manufacturer
to promptly report serious failures, malfunctions or defects to the
FAA.' Corrective measures may then be started, be they in the
form of an FAA airworthiness directive or a manufacturer's serv-
ice bulletin or instruction. It is established law that the Federal
Aviation Regulations have the force and effect of law,' that the
FAR's give constructive notice to the public regardless of actual
notice, ' and that a violation of an FAR constitutes negligence
as a matter of law.' This is consistent with the prevailing view in
most states that a violation of a statute, ordinance, or adminis-
trative regulation is negligence as a matter of law.' The failure
of a manufacturer to report a dangerous condition or a delay by
the manufacturer in reporting a dangerous condition may subject
the manufacturer to a finding of negligence as a matter of law.
Additionally, considering the seriousness of the risk to which the
manufacturer is subjecting the aviation consumer, such a failure
to warn may constitute a reckless disregard of the safety of an-
other." The extent of liability as well as its existence may be
599 N.W.2d at 634.
-14 C.F.R. §5 21.3(e)(1), 37.17(e)(1) (1979). See notes 5-8 supra, and
accompanying text.
" Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920); Tilley v. United
States, 375 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960); Sawyer v. United States, 297
F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd, 436 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1971).
"Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
' Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 407 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1969); Gas
Serv. Co. v. Helmers, 179 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1950).
'See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973);
Murfee v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sheppard v. Judkins, 476 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Texarkana 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
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affected by the fact that the manufacturer's conduct is found to
be reckless rather than negligent. Thus, the jury may be permitted
to impose punitive damages upon a reckless defendant, although
only compensatory damages would be permissible if the manu-
facturer had been merely negligent.'
THE ADEQUACY OF THE POST-SALE WARNING OR RECALL
The manufacturer has a post-sale duty to warn users of defects
and to provide curative measures.' A post-sale warning is simply
a means of affording protection from danger. Therefore, the manu-
facturer's duty to warn of a dangerous condition in a product is
a duty to give a warning which is adequate and sufficient to the
danger and which gives fair notice of the potential consequences.
A recall is more than a warning; it is an offer to take corrective
measures-to inspect, adjust, or repair. Like the warning, the
manufacturer has the duty to take corrective measures which are
adequate, sufficient and commensurate with the danger.
The adequacy of the warning or corrective measures is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to consider. For example, the Second Cir-
cuit in Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc." stated: "On the facts here,
there can be no doubt that defendant made some effort to warn
as early as 1960, although there was some evidence from which
the jury could find that a more effective warning was required
under the circumstances."
Various general criteria against which a warning is to be mea-
sured to determine its adequacy have been stated by the courts. It
has been said that a warning must be accurate," strong, and clear,"'
and one that will be readily noticed.' Any ambiguity in the lan-
2RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 501 (1965).
"Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963), rev'd
on other grounds, 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 388 & 389 (1965).
4A416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969).
4 Id. at 426.
"Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79
N.W.2d 688 (1956).
'7Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954).
4O Marigny v. Dejoie, 172 So. 808 (La. Ct. App. 1937).
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guage of a warning furnished is to be "construed against the one
who chose the words used."''
The most important consideration in measuring the adequacy
of the warning or corrective measures taken by the manufacturer
is the degree of danger. The warning is required to be appropriate
to the danger.' That is, the duty to warn or take corrective mea-
sures is one which must be done with a degree of intensity that
would cause a reasonable man to exercise for his own safety that
caution commensurate with the potential danger." From this it
follows that the likelihood of an accident taking place and the
seriousness of the consequences are important considerations with
respect to the sufficiency of the post-sale warnings or corrective
measures provided by the aviation manufacturer.
USE OF THE POST-SALE WARNING OR RECALL NOTICE
IN AVIATION PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS
Either the injured consumer or the manufacturer may seek to
utilize FAA airworthiness directives or manufacturer's service
bulletins in a products liability action. The consumer plaintiff's
purpose in seeking the admissibility of FAA airworthiness direc-
tives is to establish that the product was defective. The defendant
manufacturer's use of these post-sale materials will be an attempt
to demonstrate that the plaintiff consumer assumed the risk in-
volved.
a. Use of Post-Sale Warnings or Recall Notices by the Consumer
Plaintiff
Under strict liability principles the focus is on the product rather
than the conduct of the manufacturer. The seller may be held liable
despite exercising all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product. The essential elements in strict liability actions are:
(1) The product was defective or unreasonably dangerous;
41Schilling v. Roux Distrib. Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953). For
examples of particular warnings that have been held effective or ineffective, see
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 38 (1961).
51 Tinkey v. E.F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947);
Briggs v. National Indus., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949).
51 Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1958).
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(2) The product reached the user without substantial change in
the condition in which it was sold;
(3) The unreasonably dangerous defect was a cause of the injury
suffered by the user. 2
Through the introduction into evidence of FAA AD's and/or
manufacturer's service bulletins the plaintiff in the products case
seeks to establish a critical element of his case; that the product
was defective or unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the
manufacturer. It has been held that FAA AD's are admissible in
evidence." The two leading cases concerning the admissibility of
recall efforts are Nevels v. Ford Motor Co.' and Fields v. Volks-
wagen of America, Inc.'
In Nevels v. Ford Motor Co.,"6 evidence of a recall campaign
was admitted in a case involving an improperly tightened steering
wheel nut on a 1967 Ford Mustang. The plaintiff alleged negli-
gent manufacture or assembly of the steering mechanism and
negligence in failing to warn of the defect as required by the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.' A recall letter had
been sent to the owner of the car, but to the wrong address, prior
to the accident." The trial court quoted the Act to the jury in its
charge and let the jury determine whether a defect notice was re-
quired and whether Ford had sent a proper notice." The court of
appeals held that the charge was properly given because the recall
campaign had been alluded to by witnesses for both parties and
commented on by counsel." Evidence of the recall was held to be
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
5 Melville v. American Home Assur. Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1315 (3d Cir.
1978); FED. R. EvID. 803(8). For cases regarding admissibility of remedial mea-
sures of recall letters in other industries, see Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439
F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113,
528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974); Do Canto v. Ametek, Inc., 328
N.E.2d 873 (Mass. 1975); Manieri v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 376 A.2d 1317
(N.J. 1977); Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1976); Fields
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976).
-439 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971).
555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976).
5 6439 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971).
57 15 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1976).
5 439 F.2d at 255.
619 d. at 258.
6Id.
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relevant with respect to Ford's statutory duty and with respect
to the contention of negligent assembly in the manufacturing
process."x
In Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. a recall letter re-
garding a damaged "guide pin" in the steering column of a 1971
Volkswagen which could cause the steering to lock was held to be
properly admitted into evidence. The Fields court held the recall
letter by itself did not make a prima facie showing of a defect or
shift the burden of proof. The court did hold, however, that the
recall letter would be some evidence that a defect did exist at the
time the product left the manufacturer."3
b. Use of Post-Sale Warnings or Recall Notices by the Defendant
Manufacturer
Aviation manufacturers' service bulletins and FAA airworthi-
ness directives may also be used by a defendant in seeking to
establish an assumption of the risk defense. It is well settled in
most states that contributory negligence, a failure on the part of
the plaintiff to act according to a standard of ordinary care in
failing to discover the defect or to guard against the possibility of
a defect, is not a defense in strict liability actions." This is based
on an adoption of comment n of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 402A, which states:
61Id.
61555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976).
3Id. at 58.
6Jasper v. Skyhook Corp., 89 N.M. 98, 547 P.2d 1140 (Ct. App. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); Bendorf v. Volks-
wagenwerk, A.G., 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1975).
In Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 834, 844, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals in adopting comment n of the Restatement stated:
Cases throughout the country have followed Comment n in remov-
ing conventional contributory negligence as a defense. Messick v.
General Motors Corporation, 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972); DeFel-
ice v. Ford Motor Company, 28 Conn. Sup. 164, 255 A.2d 636
(1969); Williams v. Ford Motor Company, 454 S.W.2d 611 (Mo.
App. 1970); Devaney v. Sarno, 125 N.J. Super. 414, 311 A.2d 208
(A.D. 1973); Ford Motor Company v. Henderson, 500 S.W.2d
709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Hartzell Propeller Company v. Alex-
ander, 485 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). Annot., Products
Liability: Contributory Negligence or Assumption of Risk as De-
fense under Defense of Strict Liability in Tort, 46 A.L.R.3d 240
(1972); Annot., Products Liability: Strict Liability in Tort, 13
A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967).
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n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this
section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is
strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases (see § 524)
applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense
when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the
defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence
which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to en-
counter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of
assumption of the risk, is a defense under this section as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect
and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreason-
ably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred
from recovery. 5
Under comment n of Restatement section 402A, however, when
a plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known dan-
ger, such conduct constitutes a defense in strict liability. 6 Comment
n of the Restatement defines the defense of assumed risk as "volun-
tarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger....
Defendant has the burden of proving the defense of assumption
of the risk; he must prove the plaintiff voluntarily and unreason-
ably encountered a known danger. 8 In Luque v. McLean, 9 the
California Supreme Court summarized the defendant's burden of
proving the defense of assumed risk:
Ordinary contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a strict
liability action. 'The only form of plaintiff's negligence that is a
defense to strict liability is that which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, more com-
monly referred to as assumption of risk. For such a defense to
arise, the user or consumer must become aware of the defect and
danger and still, proceed unreasonably to make use of the product.'
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
66 Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska
1975); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
6 8Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443
(1972); Devaney v. Sarno, 125 N.J. Super. 414, 311 A.2d 208, 210 (1973);
First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-am Agricultural Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d
682, 690 (Ct. App. 1975).
69 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
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* . . However, the defendant, not the plaintiff, has the burden of
establishing such a defense .... o
The determination of plaintiff's knowledge of the existence of
the defect and appreciation of the risk involved in the use of the
product with a defect is a question of fact for the jury to deter-
mine, by weighing the evidence. The elements a defendant must
show to establish the defense of assumed risk are: (1) the plain-
tiff has knowledge of facts constituting a dangerous condition or
activity; (2) he knows the condition or activity is dangerous; (3)
he appreciates the nature or extent of the danger; and (4) he
voluntarily exposes himself to the danger. Obviously, the defend-
ant's burden to establish assumption of the risk is heavy. The
manufacturer who provides what he believes to be adequate post-
sale warnings of a defective condition and/or adequate post-sale
remedial measures may be able to establish, based on the facts of
a particular case, that the plaintiff owner or operator who received
the notice voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known
danger.
CONCLUSION
Manufacturers have a continuing post-sale duty to adequately
warn users of defects and to develop corrective measures. Avia-
tion consumers are generally advised of dangerous product condi-
tions in FAA airworthiness directives or manufacturers' service
bulletins. The aviation community has an important interest in
assuring aviation manufacturers promptly advise users of defects
in their products after the sale. The development of the law in
this area should encourage aviation manufacturers to be open
and frank in advising users of potentially dangerous conditions in
their products which the manufacturer discovers after the sale.
"Id. at 145-46, 501 P.2d at 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50.
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